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•  Evidence suggests that the implementation of 
unconventional monetary policy during the recent 
fi  nancial crisis, via credit easing and asset pur-
chases, succeeded in reducing credit spreads and 
yields, thereby providing further easing of fi  nancial 
and monetary conditions and fostering aggregate 
demand. 
•  These policy measures are most effective when 
targeted to specifi  c market failures, suffi  ciently 
large relative to the targeted market, and clearly 
communicated. 
•  The evidence must be treated with appropriate 
caution, since the evaluation of the effectiveness 
of unconventional monetary policy is subject to 
problems of identifi  cation. 
•  The ongoing fi  scal retrenchment will affect the 
outlook and therefore the timing of the withdrawal 
of monetary stimulus. 
•  Central banks should account for the potential 
negative externalities of unconventional monetary 
policies, which are often neglected in the analysis 
of their effectiveness.
T
he fi  nancial and economic crisis of 2007–09 
witnessed unprecedented policy responses 
from central banks. As the fi  rst responders, 
central banks acted aggressively, lowering policy 
interest rates and introducing extraordinary meas-
ures to provide liquidity to short-term funding mar-
kets. The intensifi  cation of the crisis in the autumn 
of 2008 and the collapse of real economic activity 
prompted many central banks to further lower policy 
rates, although their ability to continue to do so 
became constrained as short-term interest rates 
approached zero.
1 Consequently, numerous uncon-
ventional monetary policy tools were introduced to 
provide additional monetary easing.
2 These included 
new or expanded credit facilities, as well as large-
scale purchases of government securities (often 
referred to as quantitative easing, QE).
3 
The unconventional monetary policy actions were, by 
defi  nition, unusual in both size and scope, and there 
was little guidance from previous experience that 
could be used to judge their expected impact.
4 Initial 
assessments and subsequent research have led to 
an emerging consensus that many of these policies 
were effective—but a vigorous debate continues. 
This article examines the effectiveness of uncon-
ventional monetary policies implemented during the 
1  The effective lower bound (ELB) for monetary policy rates is typically a 
small positive number because of institutional characteristics and 
fi  nancial market frictions.
2  Some of these tools—particularly those that focused on restoring 
market functioning—may also be referred to as fi  nancial stability 
policies.
3 Concurrently,  fi  scal and supervisory authorities enacted measures to 
stabilize the fi  nancial system, including injecting capital into the banking 
system, guaranteeing deposits and bank debt, and implementing fi  scal 
stimulus. 
4  The literature has found that the Japanese experience with QE from 
2001–06 was rather unsuccessful. However, the circumstances under 
which QE was implemented, as well as the modalities and implementa-
tion of the program, were quite different from those of the current 
episode. 
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5 The existing 
literature concludes that, on average, asset pur-
chases were effective, since they improved market 
functioning, lowered interest rates, and helped to 
spur economic activity. These policies were most 
effective when they were targeted to address 
specifi  c market failures, were suffi  ciently large rela-
tive to the targeted market, and were clearly com-
municated with respect to their purpose (i.e., as 
part of the effort to achieve the central bank’s policy 
objective).
Nevertheless, gauging the impact of these measures 
is not straightforward: views differ with respect to 
the appropriate metrics of success, and the evalua-
tion of program effects is subject to several identi-
fi  cation problems. Moreover, most studies tend not 
to discuss the possible negative externalities arising 
from these measures, including potential fi  nancial 
market distortions, issues related to balance sheet 
management and, ultimately, concerns with respect 
to central bank credibility and independence. Thus, 
conclusions drawn from studying the effects of 
unconventional monetary policies must be treated 
with appropriate caution.
This article fi  rst defi  nes and documents these 
unconventional measures, focusing on central bank 
asset purchases and the impact of these purchases 
on central bank balance sheets. It then discusses the 
challenges in identifying the effects of central bank 
asset purchases. Given these caveats, the existing 
evidence of the effectiveness of central bank asset 
purchases on fi  nancial and economic outcomes is 
examined. Strategies for exiting from the measures 
are then explored, followed by an analysis of the 
potential costs of these measures and the broader 
implications for monetary policy frameworks.
Types of Central Bank Asset 
Purchases 
Central banks in major countries typically conduct 
monetary policy by setting a target for the overnight 
interest rate in the interbank money market. During 
the recent crisis, however, as fi  nancial instability 
intensifi  ed and policy rates approached their ELBs, 
central banks turned to asset purchases as an 
additional means to ease fi  nancial and monetary 
conditions. For the purposes of this article, asset 
5  Note that the term “unconventional monetary policy” encompasses 
other types of unconventional policies, such as conditional statements, 
which are not covered here. 
purchases are separated into credit facilities—pur-
chases of private sector assets designed primarily 
to ease fi  nancial stress—and quantitative easing—
measures by which the central bank holdings of gov-
ernment debt were expanded to provide additional 
monetary ease.
6 This section reviews such policies 
as conducted by major central banks, including the 
U.S. Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan.
7
Credit facilities
With the intensifi  cation of the fi  nancial crisis in 2008, 
central banks implemented various types of credit 
facilities to ease credit conditions and, in some 
cases, directly acted as an intermediary in dys-
functional markets.
8 Under these programs, central 
banks purchased private sector assets in certain 
credit markets that were impaired. The goals of 
these facilities were to i) improve market liquidity in 
important segments of the market for private debt 
securities; ii) further reduce market interest rates; 
and iii) ease funding conditions for fi  rms and fi  nancial 
institutions, with banks then expanding their lending 
to the private sector (Beirne et al. 2011). 
The Federal Reserve purchased private sector 
assets directly and provided fi  nancing to fi  nancial 
institutions to facilitate their purchase of private 
sector assets.
9 The Bank of England and the Bank 
of Japan introduced outright purchases of private 
sector instruments, such as commercial paper and 
corporate bonds, while the ECB purchased a limited 
amount of covered bonds.
10 Importantly, the various 
credit facilities were typically introduced when the 
policy rate was above the ELB.
6  Purchases of Government-Sponsored-Enterprise (GSE) debt and 
GSE-backed mortgage-backed securities by the U.S. Federal Reserve 
are included with government debt.
7  This article does not address unconventional policy measures 
implemented by the Bank of Canada. For the Canadian experience, 
please refer to Lavoie, Sebastian and Traclet 2011; Zorn, Wilkins and 
Engert 2009; Selody and Wilkins 2010; and Longworth 2010.
8  Such policies are often referred to as credit easing (Bank of Canada 
2009).
9  The U.S. Federal Reserve purchased commercial paper under the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), set up two facilities to 
facilitate funding of money market mutual funds, and implemented the 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), a lending facility to 
support the market for asset-backed securities.
10 In the case of the Bank of England, such purchases were initially funded 
by the issuance of Treasury Bills, rather than by central bank money, 
and thus did not increase the central bank’s balance sheet. But since 
quantitative easing began in the United Kingdom, these purchases have 
been fi  nanced by central bank reserves and have expanded the 
monetary base.
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In late 2008, as the fi  nancial crisis spilled over into 
the real economy, major central banks found them-
selves constrained by the ELB. To further ease 
monetary conditions, they turned to large-scale 
purchases of government debt. The idea behind 
such large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) is that 
they would put direct upward pressure on the price 
of the targeted assets (typically longer-dated govern-
ment debt instruments), thereby lowering their yields. 
Purchases could affect the economy through a var-
iety of channels: 
i.  Encouraging investors to rebalance their port-
folios in the direction of riskier higher-return 
assets (by reducing yields on government debt), 
thus exerting upward pressure on their prices 
and resulting in lower interest rates; 
ii.  Creating positive wealth effects through higher 
asset prices, which supports consumption; 
iii.  Stimulating consumption and investment by 
lowering debt-service costs on existing debt;
iv.  Exerting downward pressure on the exchange 
rate (although central banks did not offi  cially 
mention this channel as their objective) in order 
to favour domestic demand; 
v.  Placing upward pressure on infl  ation by raising 
domestic demand and increasing the domestic 
price of imports (through the exchange rate 
channel); 
vi. Supporting  confi  dence by demonstrating that 
the central bank would do whatever necessary 
to meet its economic objectives; 
vii. Anchoring  infl  ation expectations, thereby holding 
down real interest rates; and 
viii. Increasing the effectiveness of fi  scal expansion, 
by reducing long-term interest rates and thus 
mitigating the crowding out of investment and 
consumption (Kohn 2009). 
LSAPs put direct upward pressure 
on the price of the targeted assets, 
thereby lowering their yields 
Several central banks purchased government debt 
in their efforts to provide further monetary ease. In 
addition to purchases of U.S. Treasury securities, 
the Federal Reserve also acquired large amounts of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae. These purchases 
were critical for reinvigorating the market for MBS, 
helping to increase the availability of credit for the 
purchase of houses, lowering mortgage rates and 
supporting the housing market and fi  nancial markets 
more generally.
The size of the purchases varied according to cir-
cumstances. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England conducted sizable asset purchases, total-
ling close to 18 and 12 per cent of GDP, respectively, 
and leading to a dramatic expansion of their balance 
sheets (Chart 1).
11 The Bank of Japan and the ECB 
implemented more modest purchase programs, with 
the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme focused 
more narrowly on stabilizing securities markets, as 
opposed to quantitative easing.
12 Except for the 
ECB, the purchases of fi  nancial assets through the 
creation of central bank reserves were unsterilized.
13 
Interestingly, the Bank of England chose to explicitly 
refer to its purchase program as quantitative easing, 
since it sought to infl  uence the quantity of money in 
the economy more broadly.
11 Overall, the U.S. Federal Reserve will have purchased a total of about 
US$2.265 trillion of long-term assets by the end of the second quarter 
of 2011. The Bank of England decided to purchase a total of £200 billion 
under its Asset Purchase Facility, mainly concentrating on government 
securities, i.e., gilts. 
12 The program was launched in May 2010 at the start of the sovereign 
debt crisis which fi  rst emerged in Greece. 
13 This means that purchases were fi  nanced through an expansion of 
settlement balances.
Chart 1:  Central bank balance sheets (assets)
a. U.S. Federal Reserve
Note: Liquidity is the sum of currency swaps, TAF, MMIFF, primary dealer 
and other broker-dealer credit, AMLF, other credit extensions and loans, 
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Assessing the effectiveness of the various central 
bank measures is complicated by many conceptual 
and empirical hurdles. The primary objectives of 
the various initiatives differed greatly: credit facili-
ties were often aimed at resolving a specifi  c market 
failure, while LSAPs were motivated by a desire to 
lower interest rates, boost asset prices, and stimu-
late real economic activity. In addition, many of the 
initiatives had benefi  ts beyond their primary object-
ives. Consequently, the metrics of success are open 
to debate. But this is not the only concern: gauging 
the effectiveness of individual measures is compli-
cated by numerous identifi  cation issues. 
Gauging the effectiveness of individual 
measures is complicated by numerous 
identifi  cation issues
Contemporaneous measures and effects 
Given the nature of the crisis, central banks and 
fi  scal authorities in many countries were simultan-
eously announcing and undertaking various new 
policy initiatives. The impact of asset purchases 
on interest rates, for example, would be diffi  cult 
to estimate, since rates would be simultaneously 
infl  uenced by other central bank initiatives, macro-
economic developments (including dramatic 
increases in government defi  cits and debt, new 
information on recent economic activity and the out-
look for growth), changes in infl  ation expectations, 
and evolving risk appetite. The simultaneity issue 
is further complicated when examining the ultimate 
effects of asset purchases on economic activity and 
infl  ation, since measures of macroeconomic activity 
are infrequent and lumpy (monthly or quarterly), pub-
lished with a lag, and often revised. 
Policy lags
Potentially long and variable lags between fi  nancial 
developments, macroeconomic activity and infl  ation 
complicate the assessment. In the case of uncon-
ventional monetary policies during crisis periods, 
this challenge is exacerbated because, by reducing 
uncertainty and increasing confi  dence, these poli-
cies may have more immediate effects through the 
expectations channels in addition to effects through 
the standard channels of transmission.
Chart 1 (cont’d):  Central bank balance sheets (assets)
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An important aspect of the fi  nancial and economic 
crisis has been its protracted nature. Given the 
impaired state of the global banking system, and the 
critical interrelationships between the fi  nancial sector 
and real economic activity (which led to a negative 
feedback loop), determining what the evolution of 
economic and fi  nancial conditions would have been in 
the absence of policy responses becomes particularly 
diffi  cult.
Spillovers
While each policy initiative may have been designed 
primarily to mitigate a specifi  c challenge, they would 
all have had broader spillover effects across markets. 
For example, large-scale purchases of MBS by the 
Federal Reserve might not only improve the func-
tioning of that market, but could also affect the pricing 
of other securities through changes in perceived risk, 
which could lead to reallocations of private sector 
portfolios that raise the demand for other assets. 
Similarly, policies enacted in one country could have 
spillover effects in other countries.
14 
Fiscal policy
In addition to the simultaneity of the announcements 
and the implementation of fi  scal stimulus with uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures, the response 
of fi  nancial markets to fi  scal action varied over time, 
further clouding any assessment. In particular, in the 
early stages of the crisis, fi  scal stimulus was seen as 
a stabilizing force, because it helped provide reassur-
ance that policy-makers were doing what they could 
to avoid an even worse recession. At that stage, fi  scal 
stimulus (and the associated increase in debt and 
defi  cits) helped stabilize fi  nancial markets. As the 
crisis faded, however, concerns related to sovereign 
indebtedness in some regions caused country risk 
premiums to rise, complicating the assessment of 
policy effectiveness. 
Prices versus quantities
Expectations and confi  dence can respond very 
quickly to announcements of policy initiatives, leading 
to swift reactions in asset prices. On the one hand, 
such observations might be taken as evidence of 
policy effectiveness. On the other hand, if credit con-
ditions remained suffi  ciently tight that essentially no 
new borrowing was occurring, then the repricing of 
14 Studies of the effects of fi  scal stimulus suggest important international 
spillovers (de Resende, Lalonde and Snudden 2010).
existing assets could provide a misleading signal of 
overall policy effectiveness with respect to fi  nancial 
conditions and economic activity.
Macrofi  nancial and macroeconomic 
environment (crisis versus non-crisis)
The effectiveness of policies is infl  uenced by the 
broader economic environment. For instance, poli-
cies that are seen as particularly effective in crisis 
periods, owing to their ability to reduce uncertainty 
and improve confi  dence, may not be very effective 
in more typical non-crisis periods. Similarly, policies 
that prove to be effective at stimulating demand and 
production by reducing borrowing costs may be 
ineffective in periods of extremely tight credit. Such 
non-linearities can make it diffi  cult to determine a 
baseline for evaluating or estimating the effective-
ness of various initiatives.
Selection bias
The countries that undertook asset purchases were 
generally those that were the most adversely affected 
by the crisis. The impact of the measures taken may 
therefore have been affected by the degree of impair-
ment of the fi  nancial markets in these countries.
Taken together, these concerns present a signifi  cant 
hurdle when trying to assess the effectiveness of the 
respective policy measures. These evaluation exer-
cises should therefore be approached with an appro-
priate degree of caution. 
The Evidence 
The effectiveness of unconventional policy measures 
is, not surprisingly, the subject of ongoing debate 
and research interest. Keeping in mind the caveats 
mentioned above, the overall evidence to date sug-
gests that unconventional monetary policy initiatives 
contributed to the functioning of fi  nancial markets 
and were successful in providing additional stimulus 
through easier monetary and fi  nancial conditions.
15 
Evidence on the effectiveness of credit 
facilities 
Overall, the credit facilities implemented by major 
central banks appear to have made a positive 
15 The literature has evaluated the impact of asset purchases by analyzing 
their effect on prices (spreads and yields), quantities (i.e., turnover in 
specifi  c markets and/or the supply of credit) and, ultimately, their impact 
on the real economy. Methodologies include event studies, reduced-
form models and theoretically founded models.
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(Table 1). Both the Federal Reserve’s Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Bank of 
England’s Commercial Paper Facility seem to have 
reduced market illiquidity, lowered spreads, and 
increased issuance (Chart 2) (Dale 2009). Such facili-
ties may also have had important confi  dence effects 
in signalling that the central bank would be willing to 
act as a backstop purchaser/seller.
16 In turn, although 
the amount of funds provided by the TALF was rela-
tively small, it also appeared to revive the issuance of 
asset-backed securities, and their spreads narrowed 
considerably. 
The ECB’s Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
seems to have stabilized the covered bond market 
and contributed to a tightening of spreads on cov-
ered bonds of different maturities and in different 
jurisdictions (IMF 2010). Moreover, the program may 
have led to an increase in the issuance of bonds 
and facilitated the issuance of longer-dated bonds, 
thereby easing funding conditions for banks (Beirne 
et al. 2011). The Bank of Japan’s credit-easing facili-
ties appear to have been partially successful in 
reducing stress in targeted markets. On the one 
hand, initial outright purchases of commercial 
paper triggered a fall in the yields for these instru-
ments, with some estimating a cumulative effect on 
the commercial paper issue rate of 39 basis points 
(Hirose and Ohyama 2009). On the other hand, the  
Bank of Japan’s outright purchases of corporate 
bonds may have had a lesser impact, since the 
rounds of purchases were substantially undersub-
scribed, perhaps refl  ecting a mismatch between the 
types of bonds that banks and brokerages wanted 
to sell and the instruments that the central bank was 
willing to buy.
17 
Evidence on the effectiveness of LSAPs
Several recent studies have attempted to estimate 
the quantitative effect of LSAPs, with most studies 
focusing on the Federal Reserve’s programs (often 
referred to as QE1 and QE2) (Table 1). Overall, these 
studies suggest that LSAPs had a signifi  cant impact 
on fi  nancial markets and likely provided stimulus to 
the overall economy. In particular, a consensus has 
emerged that the fi  rst phase of the Federal Reserve’s 
LSAPs probably lowered the yield on the 10-year 
16 Bean (2011) argues that a credible statement in this respect may have 
been enough to restore normal market functioning. 
17 The Bank of Japan (2009) nevertheless argues that the compression in 
spreads on corporate bonds in fi  scal year 2009 may be attributed partly 
to the measures taken by the central bank and the government to 
facilitate corporate fi  nancing.
Treasury note, as well as on high-grade corporate 
bonds, by about 50 basis points. This is consistent 
with the observed drop in yields that occurred on 
the announcement of the purchases (Chart 3). 
Nevertheless, considerable uncertainty surrounds 
these estimates. 
Studies estimating the impact of LSAPs on the macro-
economy have generally concluded that they seem to 
have had sizable impacts on GDP growth (Table 2). 
The most important caveat to such studies is that they 
employ models tuned to non-crisis periods to assess 
the macro implications of the fi  nancial responses to 
policy actions. As discussed earlier, traditional real-
fi  nancial transmission channels may not have been 
functioning normally during the fi  nancial crisis.
The Federal Reserve’s purchases of GSE-guaranteed 
MBS appear to have eased mortgage-market condi-
tions. The 30-year conforming mortgage rate declined 
by more than one percentage point following the 
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Authors Policy Financial market impact
Adrian et al. (2010) CPFF Expansion of the CPFF was accompanied by the narrowing of the spreads on commercial paper
Agarwal et al. 
(2010)
TALF Program offered a liquidity backstop, helped to reduce spreads in core ABS classes, and funding new issuance
D’Amico and King 
(2010)
QE1 Reduction by 30 to 50 bps across the yield curve 
Doh (2010) QE1 Regression analysis: 39 bps
Gagnon et al. 
(2010)
QE1 Purchases reduced 10-year term premium by 30 to 100 bps, with most estimates in the lower and middle thirds of this range.




QE1 Event Study: Treasuries fall by a cumulative 107 bps. Regression analysis: Baa-Aaa spread reduced by 4 to 61 bps
QE2 Event Study: Treasuries fall by a cumulative 30 bps. Regression analysis: Baa-Aaa spread reduced by 7 to 21 bps
Macroeconomic 
Advisers (2010)
QE1 Initial impact: 100 bps, lasting impact: 50-60 bps
Hamilton (2010) QE2 About 11 bps at the 10-year yield, effect not signiﬁ cant
Swanson (2011) Operation Twist 
and QE2
Operation Twist and QE2 are roughly similar in size, so that the predicted effect for QE2 is 15 bps
Joyce et al. (2010) QE (U.K.) Event study: 100 bps. Econometric analysis: 30 to 85 bps
Fuster and Willen 
(2010)
MBS purchases Wide dispersion in the rate changes, reductions of up to 40 bps 
Hancock and 
Passmore (2011)
MBS purchases Announcement effect: reduced mortgage rates by about 85 bps. Actual purchasing of MBS decreased abnormal risk premiums by 
roughly 50 bps. 
Stroebel and Taylor 
(2009)




QE1 Increase in Treasury holdings was associated with a decrease of 1.08 percentage points in long-term forward rates
Note: bps stands for basis points
Table 2:  Evidence on the macroeconomic impact of LSAPs
Authors Policy Treasury yield GDP Unemployment Inﬂ  ation
Baumeister and 
Benati (2010)
QE (U.S.) Rely on estimates of 
Gagnon et al. and Bean 
Without QE, real growth would 
have been 4 pps lower in 2009Q1 
- Without QE, inﬂ  ation would have 
been 0.4 pp lower in 2009Q2
QE (U.K.) Without QE, real growth would 
have been 4 pps lower in 2009Q1 
- Without QE, inﬂ  ation would have 
been 4 pps lower in 2009Q1 
Chung et al. (2011) QE1 Term premium 50 bps 
lower
Without QE, level of real GDP 
almost 2% lower by early 2012
Without QE, unemployment 
would be 1 pp higher by 2012 
Without QE, inﬂ  ation would be 
0.7 pp lower by 2011
QE2 Additional 20 bps Without QE, level of GDP would be 
lower by an additional 1%
Without QE, unemployment 
would be higher by an addi-
tional 0.5 pp by 2012
Without QE, inﬂ  ation would be lower 
by an additional 0.3 pp
Deutsche Bank 
(2010)
QE2 Assumption: QE2 = $1 tr 
leads to 50 bps fall 
Level of real GDP 0.7% higher 
over 2 years
0.2% lower after one year and 




QE2 Assumption: QE2 lowers 
10-year yield by 20 bps
Level of real GDP after eight 
quarters increases by 0.4%
Unemployment falls by 0.1 pp 
in year 1 and 0.2 pp in year 2 
0.1 pp higher over next 2 years
Notes: bps stands for basis points, pp[s] for percentage point[s]
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size of the market to have a measureable impact.
Under what circumstances were policies 
effective?
The effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy 
measures depends on several factors. Measures 
appear to have been effective (i) when targeted to 
address a specifi  c market failure, focusing on market 
segments that were important to the overall economy; 
(ii) when they were large in terms of total stock pur-
chased relative to the size of the target market; and 
(iii) when enhanced by clear communication regarding 
the objectives of the facility. More broadly, unconven-
tional measures also appear to have been effective 
because of acute fi  nancial market stress, low confi  -
dence and a weak economic environment. Indeed, 
recent evidence suggests that the benefi  ts of asset 
purchases are substantial only at times of unusual 
fi  nancial distress (Curdia and Woodford 2010).
Given these observations, it follows that unconven-
tional monetary policies that were appropriate in one 
country may not necessarily be effective in other 
countries. The effectiveness of the policies depends 
on country-specifi  c characteristics, including institu-
tional features.
20 Consequently, overall evidence of 
effectiveness may not be generalized across coun-
tries, or even across time as the economic environ-
ment changes. 
20 Bini Smaghi (2009) argues that because euro area countries primarily 
rely on bank-based fi  nancial systems, whereas the fi  nancial system in 
the United States is market based, different policy responses are 
required.
announcement of this program and continued to 
decline after its expansion (Chart 4). The purchases 
also assured a steady demand for these securities at 
a time of strained market conditions. The purchases 
reduced abnormal risk premiums embedded in mort-
gage rates by roughly 50 basis points (Hancock and 
Passmore 2011; Gagnon et al. 2010).
18 
The effectiveness of LSAPs appears to 
depend crucially on underlying fi  nancial 
and economic conditions
The effectiveness of LSAPs appears to depend cru-
cially on underlying fi  nancial and economic condi-
tions. The magnitude of the effects of the Federal 
Reserve’s second round of purchases (dubbed QE2) 
seems to have been more modest than the fi  rst 
round of purchases (Tables 1 and 2).
19 Importantly, 
the fi  rst round of LSAPs was implemented at a time 
of considerable strain in fi  nancial markets, severely 
weakened macroeconomic conditions, and low con-
fi  dence. The overall fi  nancial and economic environ-
ment subsequently improved, implying that there were 
fewer distortions for the interventions to mitigate. 
Purchases of government debt by the Bank of 
England (QE) also appear to have had a signifi  -
cant effect: on the announcement of quantitative 
easing, yields on gilts of maturities ranging from 5 to 
25 years that were eligible for purchase fell by about 
40 to 90 basis points. Joyce et al. (2010) estimate 
that the overall impact on gilt yields was roughly 
100 basis points. Moreover, QE appears to have had 
wider effects, such as lowering corporate yields, 
helping to restore market liquidity and confi  dence, 
and stimulating nominal spending (Dale 2009). The 
ECB’s purchases of government bonds, although 
small and sterilized, appeared to temporarily calm 
markets and reduce spreads on the sovereign 
debt of peripheral European economies. But these 
spreads have widened again and remain elevated, 
indicating renewed stress. Finally, the market 
reaction to the Bank of Japan’s announcements 
to increase the size of its government bond pur-
chases has been relatively muted, perhaps because 
18 The effect may have been partly temporary because, even in the 
absence of action by the U.S. Federal Reserve, spreads would have 
come down eventually as the fi  nancial crisis passed and the economy 
began to recover. The simultaneous decline in prepayment risk and 
default risk may also account for the reduction in mortgage spreads 
(Strobel and Taylor 2009).
19 Nevertheless, several Federal Reserve offi  cials judge that QE2 has been 
effective (Bernanke 2011; Bullard 2011; Rosengren 2010; and Yellen 2011).
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of purchases. Central banks may simply allow these 
assets to mature or, in the case of MBS, not replace 
decreased holdings resulting from prepayments. 
Central banks will also want to consider decreasing 
their holdings through explicit sales, although other 
options to drain reserves are possible, such as con-
ducting reverse repos with fi  nancial market partici-
pants, offering term deposits to banks, or issuing 
central bank marketable securities. 
The ability of central banks to pay interest on reserves 
is a key element of any exit strategy, since it allows 
them to raise policy rates despite having large bal-
ance sheets and thus provides additional fl  exibility 
in formulating exit strategies.
21 The basic intuition is 
that raising the rate paid on reserve balances reduces 
the opportunity cost of excess reserves, and as such, 
banks will not want to lend out their reserves at rates 
below what they can earn at the central bank. Thus, 
the interest rate paid by the central bank should tend 
to put a fl  oor under the target for the overnight policy 
rate. Central banks can thus tighten monetary policy 
by raising the target for the overnight policy rate at 
the same time that they raise the rate paid on reserve 
balances. This allows central banks to raise interest 
rates before, or at the same time as, reserves are 
drained, and before all LSAPs made during the crisis 
are reversed. Additional fl  exibility may be available 
through policy decisions related to the corridor.
22
Several concerns arise when considering the exit from 
unconventional monetary policy. First, policy-makers 
need to allow for the possibility that concurrently raising 
policy rates and draining reserves might alter the usual 
transmission mechanism. For example, a typical policy-
rate increase could prove less contractionary than usual 
in the presence of substantial excess liquidity. Second, 
in the current environment, it is crucial to understand 
whether the standard transmission mechanism of 
accommodative policy in the form of a low policy rate 
is different from that related to the creation of reserves 
and the size of the central bank balance sheet. Finally, 
21 This fl  exibility is important in the current environment. The presidents of 
some Federal Reserve Banks have hinted that leaving rates “too low for 
too long” may create an environment conducive to the emergence of asset 
bubbles (Hoenig 2010; Dudley 2010; Fisher 2010; and Plosser 2010).
22 The upper limit of the corridor usually represents the level of the 
standing liquidity facility at which banks can obtain base money from 
central banks, whereas the lower limit represents the interest rate that 
banks can obtain on deposits at the central bank. Goodhart (2009) has 
recently suggested that in the early state of the recovery, margins may 
be allowed to be biased “downwards,” i.e., a relatively low deposit rate, 
with lending rates relatively inexpensive (close to the offi  cial rate), 
penalizing reserve buildup and encouraging borrowing from the central 
bank. Once the recovery has become fi  rmly established, central banks 
may, as part of their exit strategy, want to tilt the margins “upwards,” i.e., 
holding banks’ deposit rates close to the offi  cial rate, while at the same 
time making additional borrowing from the central bank expensive.
Exiting from Unconventional 
Monetary Policies
The implementation of extraordinary polices is only 
one challenge—the eventual exit from such measures 
must also be considered. The decision of when and 
how fast to exit from unconventional monetary poli-
cies must balance the risk of an overly aggressive exit, 
particularly in the face of fi  scal retrenchment, against 
the risk of an excessively delayed exit. In the former 
case, aggressive tightening could risk pushing econ-
omies back into recession, while in the latter case, 
the failure to unwind programs could lead to excess 
liquidity and contribute to rising infl  ationary pressures. 
Exit strategies should be specifi  ed, 
even if not needed immediately
To keep infl ation expectations well anchored, cen-
tral bank exit strategies should be specifi  ed, even 
if not needed immediately. Given the wide range of 
policy interventions that have been implemented by 
central banks, exit strategies will necessarily depend 
on facility- and country-specifi  c circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the following principles should help 
guide the exit from unconventional monetary policies:
1.  Monetary policy should be guided by objectives 
for infl  ation or price stability. 
2.  Monetary policy should be conditioned on infor-
mation regarding the economic outlook, including 
fi  scal paths. In this context, fi  scal authorities need 
to plan and communicate their intentions to the 
public. This would allow central banks to condi-
tion monetary policy on the fi  scal outlook and 
help reinforce central bank credibility. 
3.  Policy authorities need to understand how the 
monetary transmission mechanism may have 
changed.
4.  Policy credibility and central bank independence 
must be maintained to ensure the effectiveness 
of future policy. 
5.  Communication regarding exit strategies should 
be clear and should include timely reporting of 
balance sheet developments.
Whereas the use of credit facilities naturally declines 
as they become less attractive, QE will require a more 
“active” exit approach, since it represents a more 
permanent addition to the central bank’s balance 
sheet (often because of the longer duration of the 
assets acquired). An active exit from asset-purchase 
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environment is the end of the fi  scal stimulus enacted 
in response to the crisis, as well as the additional fi  scal 
restraint necessitated by the high levels of debt in many 
countries. There is heightened uncertainty in the fi  scal 
outlook relative to historical experience. The need for 
considerable fi  scal consolidation in many countries 
means that central banks will not only need to take 
account of uncertain fi  scal paths domestically, but will 




The use of unconventional monetary policy has sparked 
discussion of how such measures could affect the con-
duct of monetary policy, and their potential costs. In this 
section, we discuss some of these issues.
Unconventional monetary policy and the 
ELB
An ongoing subject of debate regarding monetary 
policy, in the context of infl  ation targeting, is the appro-
priate target rate of infl  ation. When the infl  ation target 
is relatively low, the probability that the target for the 
policy rate will approach or hit the ELB will be higher. 
This concern has prompted some observers to note 
that infl  ation targets should not be lower than the cur-
rent convention of 2 per cent.
24 But if unconventional 
tools are effective, this concern may be alleviated, thus 
reassuring those who would advocate lower infl  a-
tion targets. The current evidence with respect to the 
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy, how-
ever, is drawn primarily from the use of these meas-
ures during crisis periods. Thus, the effectiveness of 
such measures under more “normal” circumstances 
remains an open question, and the ELB could be a 
binding constraint. 
Potential costs of unconventional 
monetary policy
The use of unconventional monetary policy, both in 
crises and as part of an established monetary policy 
toolkit, may also have unintended consequences 
that should be considered when such measures are 
undertaken. In fact, studies of the effectiveness of 
23 See also Clinton and Zelmer (1997) on the challenges of conducting 
monetary policy in an environment where there are concerns about 
rising government debt. 
24 In light of the recent constraints of the ELB on monetary policy, 
Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2010) have suggested consideration 
of higher infl  ation targets.
unconventional measures seldom (if at all) attempt to 
quantify any potential negative externalities. Potential 
costs include: 
Financial market distortion 
Unconventional monetary policy measures could distort 
fi  nancial markets. Asset purchases, particularly those 
of longer-dated government securities, may suppress 
long-term interest rates, affecting investors, such as 
pension funds, that need to match long-term liabilities 
to long-term assets and potentially encouraging exces-
sive leverage and risk taking, posing fi  nancial stability 
concerns (Carney 2010). On a different note, in coun-
tries where the stock of debt is relatively small, asset 
purchases may also distort the yield curve, since such 
purchases would reduce the supply of liquid securities 
(i.e., government debt). Moreover, if asset purchases 
account for a large portion of the outstanding stock 
of government debt, the central bank could become a 
dominant market player, affecting the behaviour of other 
market participants. Lastly, purchases of private sector 
assets (such as commercial paper or asset-backed 
securities) may involve picking “winners” and “losers,” 
which raises issues of political economy. 
Additional challenges of balance sheet 
management
Asset purchases can lead to a large expansion, as well 
as a change in the composition, of the central bank’s 
balance sheet. Exiting from an expanded balance 
sheet may complicate the conduct of monetary policy. 
For example, failure to adequately manage the balance 
sheet could lead to monetary conditions that are not 
consistent with the central banks’ policy objectives. In 
addition, the purchase of risky assets may expose the 
central bank to credit risk, market risk and, thus, cap-
ital losses. The management of balance sheet risk also 
raises issues of the extent to which, and the means by 
which, the central bank should be held accountable. 
These issues underline the importance of ensuring that 
proper accountability and governance mechanisms 
are in place when considering the use of unconven-
tional policy measures.
Potential loss of central bank independence and 
credibility
Some observers have raised the concern that LSAPs 
could undermine the independence and credibility of 
the central bank, particularly if purchases of sovereign 
debt are viewed primarily as a means of facilitating 
fi  scal defi  cits or if purchases of risky assets lead to 
capital losses. In such circumstances, unconventional 
policy could undermine the central bank’s goals, since 
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Confl  ict with fi  nancial stability responsibilities
Asset purchases could potentially confl  ict with the 
central bank’s responsibilities for fi  nancial stability. 
Should lower long-term interest rates caused by 
LSAPs encourage excessive leverage and risk taking, 
central banks may fi  nd that their monetary policy 
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objectives. As central banks expand their man-
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Delay of necessary macroeconomic adjustments
Lower long-term interest rates may have broader 
unintended macroeconomic consequences (Carney 
2010). First, by suppressing debt-service payments, 
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necessary fi  scal consolidation. Second, low rates for 
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viable loans; thereby delaying necessary restructuring 
of industry, such as happened in Japan in the 1990s. 
Last, low long-term interest rates may encourage 
households to take on excessive debt or to delay 
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Conclusion
As part of the policy response to the fi  nancial crisis 
of 2007–09, central banks embarked upon a series 
of unprecedented policy interventions. The evidence 
to date suggests that these measures were effective, 
helping to mitigate the worst aspects of the crisis 
and to strengthen the recovery. Nevertheless, the 
evaluation of unconventional monetary policy has not 
yet adequately assessed the costs of such measures 
and how they “fi  t” into the overall monetary policy 
framework of the central bank. As time allows for a 
more thorough and seasoned assessment, further 
research on these issues should be duly considered, 
including:
•  How is the transmission mechanism affected by 
unconventional monetary policy?
•  How do investors reallocate portfolios in crisis 
versus non-crisis times?
•  How is the formation of expectations affected by 
the use of unconventional policy measures?
•  What are the implications of implementing asset 
purchases and managing associated risks for cen-
tral bank governance and accountability?
More broadly, future research should address the 
question of how unconventional monetary policy 
contributes to the respective monetary policy and 
fi  nancial stability functions of the central bank. 
Whereas the existing literature has measured the 
fi  nancial market impact of unconventional policies, 
a more thorough analysis is warranted to under-
stand to what extent such policies have helped the 
central bank achieve its monetary policy objective. 
Moreover, while unconventional monetary policies to 
restore fi  nancial market functioning appear to have 
been successful in their immediate objective, their 
broader implications for fi  nancial stability have yet to 
be assessed.
23 
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH CENTRAL BANK ASSET PURCHASES
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2011Bean, C. 2011. “Lessons on Unconventional 
Monetary Policy from the United Kingdom.” 
Speech to the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New 
York, 25 February.
Beirne, J., L. Dalitz, J. Ejsing, M. Grothe, 
S. Manganelli, F. Monar, B. Sahel, M. Sušec, 
J. Tapking and T. Vong. 2011. “The Impact of 
the Eurosystem’s Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme on the Primary and Secondary 
Markets.” ECB Occasional Paper No. 122. 
Bernanke, B. 2011. “The Economic Outlook and 
Macroeconomic Policy.” Speech to the National 
Press Club, Washington, D.C., 3 February.
Bini Smaghi, L. 2009. “Conventional and 
Unconventional Monetary Policy.” Keynote lec-
ture at the International Center for Monetary and 
Banking Studies (ICMB), Geneva, 28 April.
Blanchard, O., G. Dell’Ariccia and P. Mauro. 2010. 
“Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy.” IMF Staff 
Position Note 10/03.  
Bullard, J. 2011. “Quantitative Easing, Global 
Infl  ation, and Commodity Standards.” Speech to 
the Bowling Green Area Chamber of Commerce, 
24 February. 
Carney, M. 2010. “Living with Low for Long.” 
Remarks to the Economic Club of Canada, 
Toronto, Ontario, 13 December.
Chung, H., J.-P. Laforte, D. Reifschneider and 
J. Williams. 2011. “Have We Underestimated the 
Likelihood and Severity of Zero Lower Bound 
Events?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Working Paper No. 2011-01. 
Clinton, K. and M. Zelmer. 1997. “Constraints on 
the Conduct of Canadian Monetary Policy in 
the 1990s: Dealing with Uncertainty in Financial 
Markets.” Bank of Canada Technical Report 
No.80.
Curdia, V. and M. Woodford. 2010. “The Central-
Bank Balance Sheet as an Instrument of 
Monetary Policy.” NBER Working Paper 
No. 16208.
Dale, S. 2009. “Tough Times, Unconventional 
Measures.” Speech to the Association of British 
Insurers Economics and Research Conference, 
London, England, 27 March.
D’Amico, S. and T. King. 2010. “Flow and Stock 
Effects of Large-Scale Treasury Purchases.” 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series No. 2010-52.
de Resende, C., R. Lalonde and S. Snudden. 2010. 
“The Power of Many: Assessing the Economic 
Impact of the Global Fiscal Stimulus.” Bank of 
Canada Discussion Paper No. 2010-1.
Deutsche Bank. 2010. “Benefi  ts and Costs of QE2.” 
in Global Economic Perspectives, 29 September.
Doh, T. 2010. “The Effi  cacy of Large-Scale Asset 
Purchases at the Zero Lower Bound.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 
(Second quarter): 5–34.
Dudley, W. 2010. “Asset Bubbles and the Implica-
tions for Central Bank Policy.” Speech to the 
Economic Club of New York, New York City, 
7 April.
Fisher, R. 2010. “Risks to Sustained Economic 
Recovery (With Lessons Learned from Winston 
Churchill and Teddy Roosevelt).” Remarks to the 
Annual Meeting of the Waco Business League, 
Waco, Texas, 12 January.
Fuster, A. and P. Willen. 2010. “$1.25 Trillion Is Still 
Real Money: Some Facts About the Effects 
of the Federal Reserve’s Mortgage Market 
Investments.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 10-4.
Gagnon, J., M. Raskin, J. Remache and B. Sack. 
2010. “Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the 
Federal Reserve: Did they Work?” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 441.
Goodhart, C. 2009. “Liquidity Management.” In 
Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy, 
157–68. Proceedings of a symposium held by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming, 20–22 August.
Hamilton, J. 2010. “Evaluating QE2.” U.S. Econo-
Monitor. Dec 13. Available at http://www.
roubini.com/us-monitor/260165/evaluating_qe2.
Hancock, D. and W. Passmore. 2011. “Did the 
Federal Reserve’s MBS Purchase Program 
Lower Mortgage Rates?” Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series No. 2011-01. 
Literature Cited (cont’d)
24
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH CENTRAL BANK ASSET PURCHASES
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2011Hirose, Y. and S. Ohyama. 2009. “Identifying the 
Effect of Bank of Japan’s Liquidity Facilities: The 
Case of CP Operations During Financial Turmoil.” 
Bank of Japan Working Paper No. 09-E-7.  
Hoenig, T. 2010. “What About Zero?” Speech in 
Santa Fe, New Mexico, 7 April.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2010. Global 
Financial Stability Report. (April).
Joyce, M., A. Lasaosa, I. Stevens and M. Tong. 2010. 
“The Financial Market Impact of Quantitative 
Easing.” Bank of England Working Paper 
No. 393.
Kohn, D. 2009. “Interactions between Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy in the Current Situation.” Speech 
to the Conference on Monetary-Fiscal Policy 
Interactions, Expectations, and Dynamics in the 
Current Economic Crisis, Princeton University, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 23 May.
Kozicki, S., E Santor and L. Suchanek. Forthcoming. 
“Unconventional Monetary Policy, Central 
Bank Balance Sheets and Long-Term Forward 
Rates.” In Lessons for Monetary Policy from 
the Financial Crisis. Edited by J. Chadha and S. 
Holly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Krishnamurthy, A. and A. Vissing-Jorgensen. 2011. 
“The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Long-
Term Interest Rates.” 10 February. Available at 
<http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/
vissing/htm/qe_paper.pdf>. 
Lavoie, S., A. Sebastian and V. Traclet. 2011. 
“Lessons from the Use of Extraordinary Central 
Bank Liquidity Facilities.” Bank of Canada 
Review (this issue): 27–36.
Longworth, D. 2010. “Bank of Canada Liquidity 
Facilities: Past, Present, and Future.” Remarks 
to the C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto, Ontario, 
17 February.
Macroeconomic Advisers. 2010. “Quantifying the 
Effects of Fed Asset Purchases on Treasury 
Yields.” 17 June.
———. 2011. “The Macro Effects of LSAPS II: 




Neely, C. 2010. “The Large-Scale Asset Purchases 
Had Large International Effects.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Working Paper 
No. 2010-018C.
Plosser, C. I. 2010. “Economic Outlook.” Speech to 
the Entrepreneurs Forum of Greater Philadelphia, 
12 January.
Rosengren, E. 2010. “Five Questions about Current 
Monetary Policy.” Speech to the Greater 
Providence Chamber of Commerce, Providence, 
Rhode Island. 17 November.
Selody, J. and C. Wilkins. 2010. “The Bank of 
Canada’s Extraordinary Liquidity Policies and 
Moral Hazard.” Bank of Canada Financial 
System Review (June): 29–32.
Stroebel, J. and J. Taylor. 2009. “Estimated Impact of 
the Fed’s Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase 
Program.” NBER Working Paper No. 15626.
Swanson, E. 2011. “Let’s Twist Again: A High-
Frequency Event-Study Analysis of Operation 
Twist and Its Implications for QE2.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 
No. 2011-8.
Yellen, J. 2011. “The Federal Reserve’s Asset 
Purchase Program.” Speech to the Brimmer 
Policy Forum, Allied Social Science Associations 
Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, 8 January.
Zorn, L., C. Wilkins and W. Engert. 2009. “Bank 
of Canada Liquidity Actions in Response to 
the Financial Market Turmoil.” Bank of Canada 
Review (Autumn): 3–22.
25 
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH CENTRAL BANK ASSET PURCHASES
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2011